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Abstract 
As an enterprise, election forecasting has spread and grown. Initial work began in the 
1980s in the United States, eventually travelling to Western Europe, where it finds a 
current outlet in the most of the region’s democracies. However, that work has been 
confined to traditional approaches – statistical modeling or poll-watching. We import a 
new approach, which we call synthetic modeling. These forecasts come from hybrid 
models blending structural knowledge with contemporary public opinion, to generate 
ongoing nowcasts of Western European national contests, from six months prior to 
Election Day itself. These test results, based on election pools from Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and France, encourage similar research on other European electorates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Election forecasting models are generally applicable and should therefore be 
implemented in a variety of democracies. For developing comparative election 
forecasting models, we build on leading scientific approaches in the field. [For general 
reviews, see Lewis-Beck and Tien (2012), Stegmaier and Norpoth (2013)]. Recent 
applications come from the United States, where the 2012 US presidential election was 
subject to an unprecedented amount of systematic forecasting work. [See Campbell 
(2012), who offered a pre-election review of presidential forecasts; also, see Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier (2014a), and their edited symposium of pedagogical forecasting papers on 
that contest; further, see Linzer and Lewis-Beck (2015), and their edited collection of 
high-tech articles on the dynamics of forecasting that race.] The dominant scientific 
approaches for that election were executed by three groups of forecasters: structuralists, 
aggregators, and synthesizers (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2014a). 
These approaches can be delineated by their application of theory, data, and time. 
Below, we outline each, and then consider their application to elections in other 
democratic nations, namely those of Western Europe. After reviewing the relevant work 
to date, we pursue the development of synthetic models for forecasting national elections 
in Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. In the comparative spirit, we impose one 
overarching theoretical structure – a political economy one – across these three systems. 
As we shall see, the innovation of synthetic models, which combine key elements of the 
structuralist and aggregator methods, provides a promising development in election 
prediction on that side of the Atlantic. 
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WAYS OF ELECTION FORECASTING: STRUCTURALISTS, AGGREGATORS, 
SYNTHESIZERS 
 
The front-running scientific approach to election forecasting has been structural 
modeling, a method fully advanced in the United States case. For the 2012 presidential 
race, examples appear in Abramowitz (2012), Campbell (2012) and Holbrook (2012). 
Such efforts offer a theoretical model of the election outcome, usually beginning with a 
core political economy explanation, e.g., vote = f (presidential popularity, economic 
growth). [For a current review of vote and popularity functions, see Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier (2013).] In this work, the unit of analysis tends to be the nation, the estimation 
ordinary least squares (OLS) on single equations. Further, estimation is static, rather than 
dynamic, resulting in a unique final forecast. 
 An emergent rival approach to structural modeling, which draws on the public 
opinion polling tradition, is aggregation. For the 2012 presidential race, see the examples 
and discussions by Blumenthal (2014), Jackman (2014), and Traugott (2014). Such 
analysts aggregate vote intention in opinion polls, combining voter preferences (in 
percentages) over a number of multiple polls. Distinct from the structuralists, the 
aggregators offer no theory of the vote. Moreover, the unit of analysis is usually the 
nation. Finally, forecasting is dynamic, with repeated estimates across the campaign. 
Synthesizers, in contrast to the foregoing methodologies, offer something new. 
For examples, see the work of Erikson and Wlezien (2014), Linzer (2013) or Silver 
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(2012). These modelers borrow from the structuralists and the aggregators. They start 
with a political economy theory of the vote, and add to it aggregated and updated polling 
preferences. The data are analyzed at the national level or the state level. Further, the 
analysis of synthesizers may include multiple equations, and may be Bayesian. Finally, 
their forecasts are updated, with multiple estimates over the campaign. Such models join 
election theory with the strengths of aggregation and dynamic updating, and are the 
emphasis of our European efforts (see also Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville (2015)).  
 The forecasting art in Europe is expanding rapidly. And overall, we can say that 
structural models dominate the scene. For example, see Dassonneville and Hooghe 
(2012) on Belgium; Magalhães, Aguiar-Conraria and Lewis-Beck (2012) on Spain; 
Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger (2010) on France; Whiteley (2005) on the United 
Kingdom; Norpoth and Gschwend (2010, 2013) on Germany. These efforts tend to be 
based on a political economic theory of voting. Also, the modeling is single-country, 
single-equation OLS work. Estimation is static, with one unique forecast issued. The unit 
of analysis is usually, but not always, the nation.  
Aggregation, where polls are combined, and systematically used to forecast, is 
almost non-existent in Europe. For a useful exception, see Jennings and Wlezien (2015), 
who amass over 23,000 polls from 41 countries, and examine how well they predict vote 
outcome. Additionally, using individual house polls on vote intention to forecast 
elections represents a long-standing tradition, especially within the media. [In particular 
see the plentiful work on the United Kingdom, dating back to the 1980s e.g., Sanders, 
Hugh and Marsh (1987).] The situation worsens with regard to the synthesizers. We 
know of no examples of synthetic models on a general national election in Europe, with 
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the exception of our own work (Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2015), on which we 
build further here. 
 
BUILDING SYNTHETIC MODELS FOR ELECTIONS IN EUROPE 
 
For building a synthetic model, we combine a sound structural model with a sound 
polling model. Combined, they form a hybrid that can forecast national election outcomes 
accurately across a sample of European democracies. That hybrid will contain an 
explicitly theoretical and an explicitly nontheoretical component; therefore, we label it a 
“synthetic” model. First, the proposed structural model, with its political economy core, 
we write as follows: 
 
Vote t = f (Economy, Government Support). 
 
Second, the polling model, which predicts the incumbent vote share as a function of vote 
intention, we write as follows: 
 
Vote t
 
= f (Pollst-x). 
 
The synthetic model combines into one these two models. It begins with the long-
term fixed effects from electoral theory, as captured in the structural model. Then, it adds 
to that the short-term effects induced by other forces, as represented by the polling model, 
using the latest available information on Vote Intention (VIt-x) to predict the vote. The 
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addition of this VIt-x term to the specification can be justified as a solution to a missing 
variables problem. That is, other variables that help predict the vote may occur after the 
structural forecast; or, they may simply not be measurable directly at any time point. To 
the extent VIt-x helps reducing error, this should become evident over time. 
The synthetic model thus makes a blend of theory and empirics. And, it takes a 
dynamic form, with progressive re-estimations as the election becomes closer. With 
reference to the 2012 US presidential election forecasting work, then, it is most similar to 
the superlative efforts of Erikson and Wlezien (2013). We follow a similar estimation 
strategy, i.e., a non-Bayesian one. For the best in Bayesian models, applied to US 
presidential election forecasting, see Linzer’s (2013) paper on the 2008 election, and his 
VOTAMATIC blog for the 2012 election. 
The basic idea behind the synthetic model is that it operates like contemporary 
weather forecasting models (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2014b). The fundamental 
variables governing the atmosphere first generate an event forecast, for example a 
rainstorm. Then that forecast is checked against additional, incoming information, as the 
storm pattern is tracked. The initial forecast – based on long-term theories – is hence 
updated, and modified regularly by ever more current forecasts. The process thereby 
becomes dynamic and these dynamic forecasts become more accurate as the range is 
shorter. In terms of election forecasting, the fundamentals determining the behavior of the 
electorate are analyzed to predict an election first. But as Election Day draws near, more 
information on vote intentions becomes available, and this information is subsequently 
used to update the initial event forecast.  
 
  7 
SYNTHETIC MODEL FORECASTS IN PRACTICE 
 
On each of the European countries under study, we first estimate the structural model (at 
t-6). Then, we estimate the polling model by simply taking the latest single poll that is 
published. If there is more than one poll at the same time point, we simply average them. 
Finally, we make a combined, single equation synthetic model forecast, with new 
synthetic forecasts at each time a new vote intention poll is out. This dynamic assumes 
that while the structural model is fixed (at t-6), the polling model is updated as polls are 
published. This formulation allows a new “nowcast” of the election result with each new 
poll (Lewis-Beck and Tien, 2013). Each of the vote intention polls thus offers a 
correction to the prediction of the structural part. The idea of a correction stems from the 
fact that vote intention polls help solving the omitted variables problem. Vote intentions 
can therefore serve as a proxy for the variables that we cannot include in a parsimonious 
structural model. In this article, we look at three large, advanced democracies of Western 
Europe: Germany (1980-2013), the United Kingdom (1959-2010), and France (1965-
2012). 
 
GERMANY 
 
We begin with the German case, first estimating the structural model and its out-of-
sample forecast for the most recent election. [For recent structural forecasting work on 
German elections, see Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari and Lewis-Beck (2013); Norpoth and 
Gschwend (2013)]. Then, we carry out estimations from the polling model. Finally, we 
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estimate the synthetic model, and its nowcasts from t-6 to Election Day. At the end of the 
section, we evaluate model performance.  
 
a. Structural model 
As a first step, we estimate a structural model fitting German election results over time. 
The form is a basic political economy model, with an economic indicator (in this case 
GDP growth) and a political indicator (government approval) The dependent variable is 
the combined vote share of the incumbent parties.1 
 
V = β0 + β1 GDPt-6 + β2 Government approvalt-6 + ε 
 
where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties: GDP is the GDP growth 
rate (seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in the previous year) in the 
second quarter before the election quarter; Government approval is the mean value of 
satisfaction with the government’s performance (0-10) in the FGW-survey 6 months 
before the election (see the Appendix for data sources).  
 
Estimating the equation (OLS) for German Bundestag elections from 1980 to 
2009 yields the following: 
 
V = 27.157** + 1.701** GDPt-6 + 3.638* Government approvalt-6 
       (5.906)      (0.331)               (1.127) 
 
                                                        
1
. We follow Norpoth and Gschwend (2010) by only taking into consideration the chancellor’s 
party in case of a Grand Coalition and by only treating SPD as an incumbent party for the 1983 
election. 
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N = 8 (1980-2009) Adj. R2 = 0.822   
RMSE = 2.994 DW = 3.031 
***
 = significant at .001, ** = significant at .01, * = significant at .05. 
 
To make an out-of-sample forecast for the next Bundestag election, we simply plug 
into the prediction equation the appropriate values for GDP growth and Governmental 
Popularity, at a six months lag, as follows: 
 
V = 27.157 + 1.701(-0.30) + 3.638 (5.55) 
          = 46.8%  
 
The actual incumbent result = 46.3%, for an absolute forecasting error of 0.5 percentage 
points. 
 
b. Polls model and forecast of the 2013 Bundestag Election 
The assumption of the polls model is simply that vote intention polls predict the election 
result. We hence assume that the vote share is a function of the public’s vote intentions, 
as observable in polls. These polls come with some error, however, as sampling errors as 
well as systematic polling house errors are inevitable. 
 
    Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
 
 
where Vt is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intentiont-x is the 
combined vote share incumbent parties obtain in a pre-electoral poll.  
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In Figure 1, we see the prediction error from the Vote Intention Model over time. 
First, for each poll that was published in the run up to Election Day, the error from the 
real election result was calculated. The regression line reported in Figure 1 is the result of 
regressing these errors on time (measured as days to the election). As we can see, the 
error steadily decreases as the poll estimates moves closer to the day of the election. On 
the eve of the election, the error is reduced to just over 1%.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model  
The synthetic model incorporates the polling model information, generating a nowcast 
from t-6 months to Election Day. Dynamic weights are used to take into account that the 
importance of both information sources can vary over time.2 Polls are assumed to become 
more accurate moving forward – as was also apparent from looking at Figure 1 – and 
therefore are given increasing weight over time. Thus, the weights are adjusted monthly, 
in the manner shown in Table 1.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The weights applied are dynamic but fixed, and based on the assumption that the polling 
part becomes more important over time. A number of reasons can be given for this 
choice. First, except for the structural model – which is based on an analysis of historical 
                                                        
2
. Note that giving both elements a constant equal weight (each part is multiplied by 0.5) does not 
substantially change our conclusions. Results available from the authors upon request. 
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data, the forecasts are limited to a single election each time. Consequently, there is no 
variation in the dependent variable and we cannot actually regress vote intentions or the 
combined model on the outcome of the model to determine the impact of both parts of the 
synthetic model. What we do present, instead, is how different approaches (the historical 
structural model, vote intention polls and a combination of both) to forecasting the most 
recent election perform in terms of prediction error and how these errors evolve over 
time. Second, one way to allow the data to determine the weights of the structural and 
polling parts would be to take into account the ratio of the errors of the polling and 
structural models at a particular point in time. This, however, would imply relying on the 
election outcome for calculating which part of the synthetic model should receive most 
weight. Such an approach would self-evidently imply that we are no longer developing a 
general model that can be applied to forecasting an election outcome before Election 
Day. A third approach to estimating single-level models would be to rely on historical 
vote intention-data, collected in the context of different elections as well. This approach, 
however, is data intensive and requires the availability of decades long vote intention data 
series. Furthermore, implementing this method for a limited number of European 
countries for which the data to do so are at hand, indicates more error and a weaker fit 
compared to structural models (Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2015). Most likely, this is 
due to the fact that as one goes further back in time, polling data are more scarce and 
hence more sensitive to outliers. 
 
Incorporating this dynamic of weighted structural and polling parts, yields this overall 
forecasting equation for the synthetic model, 
  12 
 
V = β0 + Structural weight*[β1 GDP + β2 Government approval] + Polling weight*[Vote 
intention] + ε 
 
In words, the equation offers a polling correction to the structural forecasts, 
rendering the structural model dynamic. We can now compare its performance to that of 
the structural or polling models taken separately. In Figure 2, the absolute forecasting 
errors of each of the different model forecasts is regressed on time (days to the Election 
Day).  We observe, on the one hand, that the structural model alone generates a constant 
(and low) error over time. On the other hand, the polling model alone generates a 
declining (but always higher) error over time. The synthetic model, however, improves 
on both, offering steadily decreasing error that quickly betters the error of the structural 
model by itself. Indeed, by about five months before Election Day, it surpasses the 
accuracy of the polling model. The Synthetic Model steadily improves over time, until by 
Election Day there is virtually no forecasting error. In sum, for the German case the 
synthetic model clearly shows gains over either of the other approaches taken alone. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
a. Structural model 
Election forecasting in the United Kingdom has recently been the focus of considerable 
attention. [See, for example, the edited collection of papers by Gibson and Lewis-Beck 
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(2011)]. Different foundational structural models are possible. As a heuristic, we estimate 
a structural model of the same form as the model presented for Germany, thus using GDP 
growth rates3 and government approval data as predictors: 
 
V = β0 + β1 GDP t-6+ β2 Government approval t-6 + ε 
 
where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties; GDP is the GDP growth 
rate (seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in the previous year) in the 
second quarter before the election quarter; Government approval is Gallup and IPSOS 
Mori government approval data (% satisfied with the way the government is running the 
country) six months before the election (see Appendix for data sources). Estimating this 
structural model, for general elections in the United Kingdom from 1959 to 2005, gives 
us the following result: 
 
V = 26.403** - 0.361* GDPt-6 + 0.370* Government approvalt-6  
              (5.395)       (0.493)           (0.137)                                      
 
N = 13 (1959-2005) Adj. R2 = 0.317 
RMSE = 4.152 DW = 1.699 
***
 = significant at .001, ** = significant at .01, * = significant at .05. 
 
Next, we use these estimations to make an out-of-sample forecast of the 2010 general 
election. To this end, we add the structural information (GDP growth rate and 
government approval data) into the structural model, as follows: 
                                                        
3
. It has to be noted, however, that in line with the findings of Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Bélanger 
(2004), a structural model with inflation rates instead of GDP growth rates fits the data better. 
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V = 26.403 + 0.361 (-2.47) + 0.370 (25)  
    = 34.8%. 
 
The actual 2010 incumbent result = 29.0%, giving an absolute forecasting error of 5.8 
percentage points. 
 
b. Polls model and forecast of 2010 UK general election 
As with the German case, the polls model is as follows, 
 
Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
 
Where Vt is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intention is the 
combined vote share incumbent parties obtain in pre-electoral polls, at a given point in 
time.  
 
In Figure 3, we show the error of that prediction from polled vote intention over time. We 
observe that that prediction line remains virtually flat as it moves toward Election Day, 
yielding a forecast error of just over 2 percentage points. 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model 
The Synthetic Model for the United Kingdom case can be expressed as follows, 
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V = β0 + Structural weight*[ β1 GDP + β2 Government approval] + Polling weight*[Vote 
intention] + ε 
 
 In Figure 4, we see the prediction lines for the three separate models. Regressing 
each of the forecasts on time, the structural model is constant – with its six months lead – 
while the polling and synthetic models are updated as new polls are published. The 
structural model does poorly, with a consistently high error. The vote intention model 
clearly does better, but offers no reduction in error over time. In contrast to both, the 
synthetic model shows a steady decline in prediction error as Election Day approaches, 
and by election eve is only about one percentage point off. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
FRANCE 
 
a. Structural model 
The structural model for French presidential elections takes inspiration for a family of 
political economy models. Most recently, see Nadeau et al. (2010). The form here 
parallels exactly the foregoing models, with presidential approval instead of government 
approval data, reading thusly: 
 
V = β0 + β1 GDPt-6 + β2 Presidential approvalt-6+ ε 
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where V is the 1st round vote share of the presidential candidate of the incumbent party, 
GDP is the GDP growth rate (seasonally adjusted and compared to the same quarter in 
the previous year) in the second quarter before the election quarter, and Presidential 
approval is the percentage of respondents stating to be satisfied with how the president is 
doing his job in the IFOP-survey 6 months before the election (see Appendix for data 
sources). Below are the OLS estimates for estimating this model on all French 
presidential elections between 1965 and 2007: 
 
V = 18.666 + 2.988 GDP + 0.066 Presidential approval 
                   (14.189)  (1.185)           (0.298) 
 
N = 8 (1965-2007) Adj. R2 = 0.481 
 RMSE = 6.424 DW = 1.816 
 
While all estimated effects are in expected directions, none of them reaches a 
conventional level of statistical significance because of collinearity. However, the overall 
model fit of the French structural model suggests almost half of the variance can be 
accounted for. Thus, we go on to employ the model to make a 2012 forecast.  
 
Next, we rely on this structural model to produce an out-of-sample forecast for the 2012 
French presidential election. We hence plug in the structural information (GDP and 
presidential approval, each with a six months lag) in the equation of the structural model: 
 
 
V = 18.666 + 2.988 (1.5) + 0.066 (31) 
  
                = 25.2% 
  17 
 
 
The actual 2012 incumbent presidential candidate result = 27.2%, which implies an 
absolute forecasting error of 2 percentage points. 
 
b. Poll model and forecast of 2012 French presidential election 
As with the earlier cases of Germany and the United Kingdom, the polling model reads as 
follows: 
 
Vt = f (Vote intentiont-x + ε) 
 
where V is the combined vote share of the incumbent parties and Vote intention is the 
vote share the presidential candidate of the incumbent party obtains in pre-election 
poll(s), at a given point in time.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 5, the forecast from the polls alone steadily improves over time, 
falling from an error of about 2.5 percentage points five months out, to about one 
percentage point a month before the election. 
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
c. Synthetic model 
Next, the structural model is combined with the polls, to generate a synthetic model. As 
we did for Germany and the United Kingdom as well, the structural and polling parts are 
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weighted to take into account that polls become more accurate predictors of the election 
result over time. 
  
V = β0 + Structural weight*[ β1 GDP + β2 Presidential approval] + Polling weight*[ β3 
Vote intention] + ε 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6, where we regress each of the model’s predictions on the 
number of days until the election, the structural model works better than the polling 
model until about 4 months out, after which the Polling model does better. However, the 
synthetic model does better than either, from about three months out, when the error 
drops below two percentage points, and continues to drop. 
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
With this article, we wish to advance election forecasting theoretically and 
methodologically further building on our previous work examining synthetic forecasting 
models for European democracies (Lewis-Beck and Dassonneville, 2015). With respect 
to theory, we put forward a political economy core model, defined structurally by the 
presence of key macro-economic and macro-political indicators, namely economic 
performance and government satisfaction. We test this structural model across a sample 
of leading Western European democracies, and find that it affords a modicum of 
predictive power, and at a substantial lead (of 6 months before the election). However, 
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this structural model, by itself, leaves behind too much forecasting error. Further, it offers 
only static, rather than dynamic, forecasts.  
Therefore, we supplement these structural models with polling models, based on 
vote intention. We show that, with the addition of vote intention measures, so forming 
what we call a synthetic model, considerable gains in accuracy can be made in the 
forecasting of these Western European elections. However, it is worth underlining that 
both components of the synthetic model – the structural part and the vote intention part – 
are important. Sometimes the structural model seems to add more, as in the German case, 
while at other times the vote intention part seems to add more, as in the United Kingdom 
case. Or, the contributions may appear mixed within one particular electoral system, as in 
the French case where it appears that the structural component dominated early, the vote 
intention component later. Be that as may be, the essential point remains: the synthetic 
model, with its combination of methods, works better than either of these leading 
methods taken alone. 
What is the next step? Clearly, our work takes only a first step. The synthetic 
model needs to be tested against other democratic electorates. That is easier said than 
done, if our experience at trying to amass the necessary data serves as a guide. We 
explored other Western European democracies, e.g., Norway, The Netherlands, Ireland, 
but could not amass satisfactory data sets. Of course, these difficulties multiply, when 
other democratic nations, beyond Europe, are considered. Another way to expand the 
number of observations would involve lower the level of analysis, from the nation to the 
district. For instance, in the French case, analysis might go forward with region as the 
case unit, rather than the nation as a whole. But that strategy carries its own difficulties, 
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in particular the lack of proper measures of government support, not to mention the 
technical issue of spatial autocorrelation that would demand correction. Nevertheless, 
these obstacles cannot be allowed to stand indefinitely. We must make the effort to apply 
synthetic models to the elections, including second-order elections, of other European 
democracies. 
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APPENDIX. DATA SOURCES 
 
GERMANY 
 
 Government approval : Data from FGW Politbarometer (1977-2013), question 
wording is « Sind Sie mit den Leistungen der Bundesregierung aus xxx und xxx 
eher zufrieden oder eher unzufrieden ? Bitte beschreiben Sie es wieder mit dem 
Thermometer von plus 5 bis minus 5. ‘Plus 5’ bedeutet, dass Sie mit den 
Leistungen der Regierung voll und ganz zufrieden sind. ‘Minus 5’ bedeutet, dass 
Sie miet den Leistungen der Regierung volständig unzufrieden sind. Auch hier 
können Sie mit den Werten dazwischen Ihre Meinung abgestuft sagen. » and was 
transformed into a 0-10 scale of government approval. For 1983 no information 
was available at six months before the election, approval rates from seven months 
before the election month were employed. 
 GDP: Data are seasonally adjusted quarterly national GDP accounts (change on 
the same quarter of the previous year) and come from the Federal Statistical 
Office Germany (1970-2013). 
 Polling data : Vote intention question from Allensbach, Emnid, Forsa, 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, GMS, Infratest dimap and INSA polls for the 2013 
elections, as available on www.wahlrecht.de. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
 Government approval data : 1959-1997 Gallup Poll (Butler & Butler, 2000) ; 
2000-2010 IPSOS Mori (www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll). 
 GDP data are seasonally adjusted national GDP accounts (change on the same 
quarter of the previous year), retrieved from OECD.Stat. 
 Polling data : Voting intention questions as compiled by Mark Pack 
(www.markpack.org.uk/opinion-polls/). 
 
FRANCE 
 Presidential approval data: Percentage of respondents saying to be satisfied with 
how the president is doing in IFOP monthly barometer (www.ifop.fr.)  
 GDP: quarterly national GDP growth rates (seasonally adjusted and compared to 
same quarter of the previous year), retrieved from the OECD statistics database 
(stats.oecd.org). 
 Polling data: BVA, CSA, Harris interactive, IFOP, IPSOS, LH2, OpinionWay and 
TNS Sofres vote intention data. Assembled by and retrieved from Jocelyn Evans. 
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Figure 1. Predictive power of polls over time (2013 Bundestagelection) 
 
Note: Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2013 election result). Solid line 
indicates linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Table 1. Importance weights over time 
Time to election Structural weight Polling weight 
-6 months 6/6 0/6 
-5 months 5/6 1/6 
-4 months 4/6 2/6 
-3 months 3/6 3/6 
-2 months 2/6 4/6 
-1 months 1/6 5/6 
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Figure 2. Linear model fit of errors over time, Germany. 
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Figure 3. Predictive power of polls over time (2010 UK general election) 
 
 
Note: Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2010 election result). Solid line 
indicates linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Figure 4. Linear model fit of errors over time, United Kingdom. 
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Figure 5. Predictive power of polls over time (2012 Presidential election) 
 
Note: Absolute errors of vote intention polls (compared to 2012 election result). Solid line 
indicates linear fit of errors regressed on time. 
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Figure 6. Linear model fit of errors over time, France. 
 
 
 
